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ABSTRACT
The Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 incorporated, in large measure, progressive social measures recommended by Mr Justice Woodward to facilitate economic development for 
Aboriginal people. These included fi nancial provisions for mining moneys to be channelled to Indigenous 
interests in order to facilitate the empowerment of land councils and the independent funding of the 
land claim process; to support regional economic development and the amelioration of the negative 
impacts of mining; and to assist general improvements in the socioeconomic status of Aboriginal people 
throughout the Northern Territory. This paper broadly assesses how over $300 million in mining royalty 
equivalents paid in the last 20 years to the Aboriginals Benefi t Trust Account (ABTA) have been utilised; 
whether largely unchanged provisions in the Land Rights Act made in 1976 are still appropriate in 1996 
after passage of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 and the Native Title Act 
1993; and if not, what changes to the statute need to be considered by Indigenous interests to ensure 
that access to scarce discretionary resources are utilised optimally in the future. The analysis will end on 
a speculative note by assessing where Aboriginal economic development and land rights will be in 20 
years time, with and without changes to the statute.
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The Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (henceforth the ALRA) incorporated, in large measure, progressive social measures to facilitate economic development for Aboriginal people 
as recommended by Mr Justice Woodward’s Aboriginal Land Rights Commission (Woodward 1974). It is 
interesting to note, however, especially in the current political climate, that these measures had their 
historical origins in equally progressive, if not radical, measures instituted by Paul Hasluck when Minister 
for Territories in the early 1950s.
Woodward’s recommendations were implemented in statutory measures that earmarked royalties raised 
on Aboriginal land for the use by Aboriginal people in three ways:
• to provide independent funding, and associated political infl uence, to Aboriginal land 
councils;
• to ameliorate the negative impacts of mining on adjacent Aboriginal communities and provide 
fi nance for regional economic development; and
• to provide resources for the economic betterment of Aboriginal people throughout the 
Northern Territory.
The central proposition of this paper is that the operations of the fi nancial institutions established under 
the ALRA have been extremely successful drivers of Aboriginal economic development in the past 20 
years. This argument is couched very much in terms of the opportunities that statutory arrangements 
have provided to expand the Aboriginal land base in the Northern Territory, with associated potential for 
longer-term and strategic economic gains for Aboriginal people.
1
Aboriginal economic development and land rights are very complex policy arenas and there are no 
perfect statutory solutions: there are a number of current, and not so current, issues that need to be 
addressed to improve the statutory framework. Some will be outlined. The paper ends by considering 
some strategic future options that the Aboriginal leadership, and in particular land councils, need to 
consider to ensure that the gains of the past 20 years are consolidated in the next 20 years.
NON-REVISIONIST HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS
From 1911, when the Commonwealth took over administration of the Northern Territory, to the 
early 1950s, an unusual political economy of reserved land and associated controls over commercial 
development, especially mineral exploration of reserves, existed. The Commonwealth earmarked 
considerable tracts of unalienated land as reserves for Aboriginal people under Crown Land Ordinances. 
The Aboriginals Ordinance 1918 limited access of non-Aboriginal people onto these declared reserves. 
Mining laws also denied the holders of miners’ rights access to reserves; prospecting was forbidden. 
During the period 1911 to 1952 this regime held sway, with very few exceptions (Altman 1983: 3-9).
In 1952, in the assimilation policy era, restrictions on mining appeared likely to be lifted after the discovery 
of bauxite in the Arnhem Land reserve, and a perceived strategic need for this mineral. The Minister for 
Territories at the time instituted a process whereby Aboriginal people could benefi t fi nancially from 
mining on reserves. The discourse of that time focused on regional economic development, rather than 
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on cultural or social issues: the then Minister, Paul Hasluck, was adamant that the Administrator, who 
could now allow mining on reserves, would only do so in circumstances where signifi cant mineral deposits 
were discovered. If mining went ahead on reserves, Aboriginal people were to be compensated.2
The Aborigines Benefi ts Trust Fund (ABTF) established in 1952 introduced institutional mechanisms that 
continue to exist, in modifi ed form, today. First, the new provisions allowed for royalties from mining on 
reserves to be earmarked for the use of Aboriginal people, irrespective of the fact that neither statutory 
nor common law, at that time, recognised Aboriginal land ownership; Aboriginal people then neither 
owned the land nor the minerals, but they were allocated the royalties.
Second, if mining occurred on Aboriginal reserves then the statutory royalty was doubled from 1.25 per 
cent of the value of minerals to 2.5 per cent. Under these provisions, mining companies were penalised 
for mining on reserves, a disincentive that the Minister for Territories intentionally created to discourage 
insignifi cant development that would unnecessarily impinge on Aboriginal people. On the other hand, 
the Minister was adamant that, if mining occurred on reserves, Aboriginal people would benefi t.
Mining did not eventuate in 1952, but began on Groote Eylandt in 1965. Manganese deposits were 
discovered on the island and the Church Missionary Society (CMS) took out prospecting rights on 
behalf of Aboriginal people. Subsequently, Broken Hill Proprietary Company Limited (BHP), successfully 
negotiated with CMS to give up its prospecting rights in exchange for an additional negotiated royalty: 
BHP was willing not only to pay the double statutory royalty of 2.5 per cent, but also in this situation 
an additional 1.25 per cent.
At Gove, on the other hand, in 1968 Nabalco was unwilling to pay the double royalty to mine a massive 
bauxite deposit, but Commonwealth Government desire for the mine resulted in the passage of a special 
ordinance which incorporated a less than generous output-based statutory royalty that converted to a 
value-based royalty of only about 1 per cent.3
Partington (1996) has recently depicted Hasluck as the champion of the assimilationist era. And while 
Partington (1996: 71) briefl y discusses Hasluck’s role in ensuring the payment of a double royalty if 
mining occurred on Aboriginal reserves, his analysis does not extend to seeing the paradox that Hasluck’s 
ABTF was the antecedent to the key fi nancial institution in the ALRA, the Aboriginals Benefi t Trust 
Account (ABTA): Partington’s arch assimilationist created the key economic institution of the land rights 
era, a long-standing hallmark and product of self-determination.
THE NEW ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF THE ALRA
The functioning of the ALRA is largely fi nanced from mining activity on Aboriginal land. This is an aspect 
of the legislation that is poorly understood. With the passage of the Act in 1977, all former reserves 
(Schedule 1 lands) were transferred to Aboriginal ownership. The subsequent expansion of the Aboriginal 
land base via the claims process has been primarily funded from what are termed today ‘mining royalty 
equivalents’. This term was created when it was recognised that Aboriginal people did not receive mining 
royalties, as generally perceived, but received their equivalents paid from Commonwealth consolidated 
revenue (Altman 1983: 48). This change occurred because fi nancial provisions of the ALRA were enacted 
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at the same time as the Northern Territory became self-governing. Consequently, mineral rights (and 
associated royalty rights) for all minerals, except uranium, were vested with the Northern Territory 
Government.4
The operations of the ABTA, the institutional mechanism created to distribute and accumulate mining 
royalty equivalents, are complicated. To simplify the analysis, the concentration here is on the payment 
into the ABTA of ‘statutory royalty equivalents’, that is, the equivalents of royalties stipulated in mining 
law5 and their utilisation. The income of the ABTA comes from royalty equivalents and from investment 
income earned on accumulated funds. In Table 1, this income stream is shown for the period 1978-79, 
when the ABTA fi rst began operations, to 1995-96: it totals $390 million in nominal terms. The payments 
out of the ABTA are principally of three types and have accounted for $366 million, or 92 per cent of the 
ABTA’s income in the period 1978-79 to 1995-96.
The fi rst payments out of the ABTA are to incorporated groups whose members are traditional owners of, 
or residents in, areas affected by mining, although the geographic jurisdiction of such areas has never 
been precisely defi ned. It is land councils which determine how these moneys will be divided between 
Table 1. ABTA income and expenditure, 1978-79 to 1995-96.a
Year Total income 
($ million)
Total expenditure 
($ million)
Balance at 30 June 
($ million)
1978-79 2.1 1.6 1.9
1979-80 2.3 2.3 1.9
1980-81 4.3 3.6 2.5
1981-82 6.1 6.2 2.5
1982-83 18.3 13.5 7.3
1983-84 18.1 18.9 6.5
1984-85 19.7 18.6 7.4
1985-86 23.6 18.9 16.7
1986-87 23.3 15.9 23.3
1987-88 21.9 21.9 23.4
1988-89 21.7 26.2 18.9
1989-90 37.7 28.5 28.0
1990-91 38.0 33.5 34.6
1991-92 37.3 37.2 34.7
1992-93 20.5 31.5 23.9
1993-94 34.3 27.3 30.9
1994-95 31.4 28.8 33.5
1995-96 29.4 31.3 31.5
Total 390.0 365.6
a. Data do not add up due to carryover from the ABTF, ex gratia payments, rounding error, other expenditure, taxation, etc. and 
changes in accounting conventions over time. Data for 1995-96 have not been audited.
Source: ABTA, Darwin, August 1996.
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Table 2. ABTA major expenditure categories, 1978-79 to 1995-96.a
Year
Land councils expenses
ss.64(1) and 64(7)
($ million)
Major expenditure categories
Areas affected moneys 
s.64(3)
($ million)
General grants to NT
s.64(4)
($ million)
1978-79 0.5 0.3 2.5
1979-80 1.4 0.6 1.1
1980-81 2.0 1.2 0.5
1981-82 3.8 1.7 0.9
1982-83 7.4 5.3 0.7
1983-84 7.1 5.1 2.0
1984-85 8.6 5.2 4.9
1985-86 8.7 6.7 3.5
1986-87 8.7 6.0 1.1
1987-88 12.0 5.6 4.1
1988-89 12.2 5.6 8.1
1989-90 14.9 8.4 2.5
1990-91 14.3 10.7 8.3
1991-92 17.8 11.4 7.7
1992-93 16.2 5.6 9.7
1993-94 16.5 9.7 0.5
1994-95 17.2 8.6 2.3
1995-96 19.2 8.0 3.5
Total 188.5 105.7 63.9
a. Data do not always add up due to rounding error, other expenditure, taxation, etc. Data for 1995-96 have not been audited.
Source: ABTA, Darwin, August 1996.
regional incorporated groups, often called ‘royalty associations’.6 These payments account for 30 per cent 
of the royalty equivalents received with respect to any particular resource development project. Over 
the period 1978-79 to 1995-96, $106 million, or 27 per cent of ABTA’s total income, was paid via land 
councils to a growing number of incorporated groups in ‘areas affected’.
Payments to land councils to meet their operational expenses are also non-discretionary. Land councils 
are statutory authorities established by Commonwealth law with legally specifi ed functions. This is not 
to say that they are not very unusual statutory authorities, primarily because they are representative and 
therefore highly political organisations. Their budgets are submitted for approval to the Federal Minister 
for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs. While 40 per cent of ABTA royalty-equivalent income 
is earmarked for land council operational costs, if approved budgets exceed this amount, additional 
resources can be made available via so-called ‘supplementary funding’.
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Conversely, if earmarked payments to land councils exceed approved budgets, these ‘surpluses’ must 
be distributed. During the period 1978-79 to 1995-96, land councils received $188.5 million to meet 
their operational expenses. This amount accounted for 48 per cent of ABTA income. While the cost of 
land councils has been politically contentious at times, it has also been argued that these costs could 
have been limited to close to 40 per cent but for the impost well after the passage of the ALRA of a 
new mining withholding tax (Altman 1985; Crough 1989; Australian National Audit Offi ce 1993) on any 
royalty equivalents paid out of the ABTA.
Payments made as grants to be used to, or for, the benefi t of Aboriginal people residing in the Northern 
Territory are discretionary, being based primarily on the recommendations of an all-Aboriginal advisory 
committee nominated by land councils. While Mr Justice Woodward (1974) recommended that these 
payments should account for 30 per cent of the ABTA’s receipts, over the period 1978-79 to 1995-96 
they have totalled $64 million, or only 16 per cent of the ABTA’s total income. These payments are 
arguably intended to compensate Aboriginal people who neither own land in the Northern Territory nor 
benefi t from economic development on their land; since 1989 a signifi cant proportion of these moneys 
has been used to purchase pastoral stations that have then become eligible for land claim.
PAST PERFORMANCE
Whether the millions paid to the Northern Territory land councils to claim and manage Aboriginal land 
have been optimally spent is a complex question. But there is little doubt that the transfer of land to 
Aboriginal interests via the claims process is a redistribution, or restitution, of a land base that has the 
potential to be of immense future economic signifi cance.
In 1977, 258,000 square kilometres of then existing reserves were scheduled and transferred to 
inalienable Aboriginal title. This represented 19 per cent of the Northern Territory. By July 1996, the 
Aboriginal land base had more than doubled to 560,000 square kilometres or 42 per cent of the Northern 
Territory. Some of this expansion occurred owing to negotiated Northern Territory title to land (14,500 
square kilometres). But the vast majority of the expansion was due to successful claims which expanded 
the Aboriginal land base by 275,000 square kilometres, almost all of which was unalienated Crown land 
at the time of claim. It is estimated that once the claims process is completed (new claims cannot be 
lodged after 1997) Aboriginal land could cover over half the Territory.
Even assuming that all the royalty equivalents paid to land councils were used to fi nance land claims, 
inalienable title to 275,000 square kilometres has been gained at a cost of only $685 per square 
kilometre.7 While it can be argued that this land base has had limited immediate and visible impact on 
Aboriginal economic status, it is likely to have immense economic value in the 21st century, especially 
if Aboriginal owners negotiate with mining, tourism, commercial harvesting and pastoral interests for 
multiple use of these lands, possibly in joint ventures.
The utilisation of moneys paid to ‘areas affected’ has not been rigorously assessed. There is evidence that 
in some situations impressive regional developments have occurred, most notably at Kakadu National 
Park via the Gagudju Association (Altman 1983, 1996; O’Faircheallaigh 1986), and in central Australia 
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via the Ngurratjuta Association (Marshall 1994). There is also documented evidence of failures, in 
terms of regional economic development, as with the Kunwinjku Association in Western Arnhem Land 
(O’Faircheallaigh 1988; Altman and Smith 1994).
It is the granting operations of the ABTA that have been most closely monitored, primarily because the 
ABTA has been institutionally located within the Aboriginal affairs bureaucracy and has consequently 
been amenable to constant scrutiny. It has been reviewed on a number of occasions and each time it has 
been criticised for lacking appropriate fi nancial and expenditure policies, but also for making grants in 
contravention of its own policies. Blame has invariably been laid with the ABTA Advisory Committee, but 
rarely with the Commonwealth Minister or his delegates. 
A key criticism made of the ABTA as a trust account is that it has a poor savings and investment 
performance: its accumulated reserves at 30 June 1996 totalled $31.5 million (in nominal terms) or 8 
per cent of income. However, such concern is, in my view, misplaced as there is no statutory requirement 
for the ABTA to save; indeed, Woodward’s (1974) recommended 40/30/30 formula merely treated the 
ABTA as a clearing house. Furthermore, in strategic terms, if Aboriginal interests are viewed globally then 
investment in successful land claims may prove of far superior value to accumulated fi nancial reserves.
CURRENT ISSUES
Whether the ALRA is the economic success story in Aboriginal affairs policy of the past 20 years, as I 
argue, will be judged with greater fullness of time; certainly recent events and the current inability of 
the Native Title Act 1993 to transfer land to Indigenous Australians suggests that land councils may have 
been prescient in focusing so intently on claiming land during what future historians may term a 20-
year window of opportunity. In the next 20 years, the institutional structures of the ALRA will need to 
increasingly adapt from a focus on land claim to land development. This shift will present land councils 
with an increasingly complex juggling act: on the one hand, they will need to continue to represent 
their constituents; on the other hand, they will need to focus on wider development concerns. There are 
several broad issues that need to be addressed.
First, any impropriety in the utilisation of royalty equivalents paid to areas affected by resource 
development projects will leave land councils and, indirectly the ALRA, potentially vulnerable. To date 
there has been an evident reluctance by both the Commonwealth and land councils to work together 
to improve the effectiveness of royalty associations, even when outcomes have been poor. In a recent 
review of the relatively successful Gagudju Association, the following general points were raised for the 
Northern Land Council to consider (Altman 1996: 46):
• Why are statutory royalty equivalents paid to incorporated groups in areas affected by mining? 
At what point do these public moneys become private?
• To what purposes should these public moneys be applied and should areas affected moneys be 
payable to individuals?
• Should the statute specify an investment ratio for royalty associations and categories of 
investments permissible?
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• Should areas affected be more precisely defi ned and should residents of these affected areas 
be differentiated in any way from traditional owners of these areas?
• Should land councils have a formal role in regularly monitoring the activities of royalty 
associations?
These are complex issues for a representative organisation to address for a variety of reasons. Land councils 
may not wish to monitor the activities of royalty associations because this places them in the invidious 
position of being in potential direct confl ict with their constituents. It might be preferable to allow 
governments to monitor the activities of these associations, but this will require statutory amendment. 
Similarly, land councils and government are all too aware that the only guaranteed returns from mining 
to traditional owners is via areas affected moneys; these need to be provided as an inducement to 
traditional owners to trade away their de facto property rights in minerals provided by the veto (or right 
of consent) provisions. Alternatively, inducements can be provided to traditional owners via agreement 
payments, but such moneys would arguably be more private than royalty equivalents and hence less 
legally amenable to external accountability.
Second, in 1984 it was recommended that the ABTA should become a peak organisation that operated 
as a statutory authority to independently manage all fi nancial aspects of the ALRA (Altman 1985: 26-9); 
this recommendation was never implemented. Today, over ten years later, this view remains valid.
The ABTA’s granting operations, which even today remain under ministerial control, are looking 
increasingly anachronistic. The fact that the ABTA only retains income after the payment of non-
discretionary areas affected moneys and land council administration expenses has not only marginalised 
its operations, but has also frequently placed it in an adversarial relationship with land councils as 
supplementary funding directly impinges on resources available to the ABTA Advisory Committee for 
granting purposes.8 The ABTA itself is in an invidious position: when it provides grants to purchase 
pastoral stations for Aboriginal people it is criticised by non-Indigenous vested interests for providing 
a means under the ALRA to convert these stations to Aboriginal freehold title. When it responds to 
Aboriginal priorities, such as providing grants for the purchase of vehicles, it is criticised as economically 
irresponsible.
One of the tensions that has bedevilled the ABTA’s activities is that between the broad policy ambit of 
self-determination, which recognises that granting activity should be in accordance with Aboriginal 
priorities and which has resulted in high expenditure, and bureaucratic and governmental preferences 
for accumulation. It is land councils who have strategically recognised that the resources of the ABTA 
could be utilised to both purchase land and as a source of development capital. But this recognition has 
not resulted in a concerted effort to seek statutory amendment to establish the ABTA as the overriding 
authority that not only manages all fi nancial resources raised from commercial activity on Aboriginal 
land, but also has mandatory statutory functions to develop that land.
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STRATEGIC OPTIONS FOR THE NEXT TWO DECADES
Land councils have been brilliant in defending established rights in the ALRA in the face of challenges 
from many quarters, including the Commonwealth’s preferred national land rights model in 1985 (Libby 
1989). Over the next two decades, if not in the next few years, the ALRA could become increasingly 
entangled in a potentially more encompassing issue: native title. Much will hinge on the High Court 
decision in the Wik case, but it is certainly a possibility that co-existence of native title on pastoral leases 
will be recognised. This would be welcomed by Indigenous Australians. But this could see the Howard 
Government move quickly to amend the Native Title Act 1993 to extinguish native title or remove the 
right to negotiate on pastoral leases. It is not diffi cult to foreshadow, in such a context, a renewed 
attempt by the Northern Territory Government to dilute the existing right of veto in the ALRA on the 
grounds that it is a far stronger property right than the right to negotiate.
Under these circumstances it is imperative, in my view, that land councils actively seek to develop 
solutions to any existing problems in the ALRA (such as those outlined above and continuing concern 
about conjunctivity in right of consent provisions)9 and actively market them to the Federal Parliament 
so that they can infl uence directly any potential reform agenda.
There is a pessimistic mood afoot in Indigenous affairs that is depicting the past 20 years as a 
failure in terms of improving the socioeconomic status of Indigenous Australians. Progressive 
policies such as land rights, and associated mechanisms for longer-term economic development, are 
presented as part of the problem rather than as part of the solution. Under these circumstances, 
it is incumbent on land councils to maintain, and possibly strengthen, their focus on development 
that has already been evident in recent years. In political terms, this will require a fi ne 
balancing act between the interests of constituents, in all their diversity, and wider interests; between 
acceptable development and uncontrolled developmentalism.
CONCLUDING COMMENT: LAND RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
In the 1950s, Hasluck established the ABTF as an institution to facilitate Aboriginal economic development 
during the assimilationist era. This instrument was incorporated, in modifi ed form, in the ALRA as the 
ABTA during the current modern policy era of self-determination. Can the land rights framework deliver 
economic development in the 21st century in a manner that is neither assimilationist nor separatist? 
Social indicators derived from the fi ve-yearly census clearly indicate that there has been little change 
in the overall economic status of Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory.10 A clear correlation 
between land rights and economic development cannot be demonstrated to date. This could be because 
normative criteria do not accurately refl ect economic (not to mention cultural, social and political) 
benefi ts to Aboriginal people from land rights. Land might be used for unorthodox commercial activities, 
like wildlife harvesting, or non-market activities, like hunting and gathering (see Bomford and Caughley 
1996). Such activities improve people’s standards of living, but are not measured by offi cial statistics.11 It 
could also be because the historical legacy associated with dispossession, exclusion from the mainstream 
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provisions of the Australian state, and other consequences of past government policy and practice will 
take far longer than 20 years to rectify.
This paper argues that the transfer of land to Aboriginal interests in the Northern Territory will have 
signifi cant longer-term positive impacts. But it must be recognised that land is only one factor of 
production; policy makers and Aboriginal interests must recognise that, if enhanced economic status 
is a goal, then that land must be developed via mining, tourism, pastoralism or commercial harvesting. 
Such development will require access to capital, investment in education (human capital) and access to 
entrepreneurship. While all land councils have established development corporations, access to capital 
remains a real constraint on development. This is why consideration must be given to accessing the 
ABTA’s reserves for development purposes. And, equally importantly, Indigenous people must access big 
business expertise. The most obvious way that this can occur, as demonstrated in a number of situations, 
is by joint venturing with non-Indigenous partners. The activities of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commercial Development Corporation are instructive (see Arthur 1996).12 If development is the 
goal, then ventures will need to be strictly commercial. And the mind-set will need to be reconciliatory: 
‘developing the land together, rather than them and us’. Alternatively, in those situations where economic 
betterment is not a high priority goal then this can be accepted, at least under current land rights law.
In celebrating the twentieth Anniversary of Land Rights, it is appropriate to end with a key economic 
quote from Woodward (1974: 138), who noted ‘There will be no immediate and dramatic change in 
the Aborigines’ [sic] manner of living. In truth the granting of land rights can only be a fi rst step on a 
long road towards self-suffi ciency and eventual social and economic equality for Aborigines’. In reply 
to Woodward, this paper suggests that a very positive fi rst step has been taken in the last 20 years. The 
challenge now is to effectively utilise the economic institutions created under the ALRA to continue to 
head in the right direction in the next 20 years.
NOTES
1. The focus here is on Aboriginal benefi t: others, like Centre for International Economics (1993) contra to Manning 
(1994), have argued the costs and benefi ts for the Northern Territory economy generally of the ALRA.
2. No administrative or statutory mechanism was established until the early 1970s to ensure that those who directly bore 
economic, and other social and cultural, costs associated with mining actually received a share of royalty payments or 
that such payments were linked to actual costs incurred. It was also unclear how mining would occur without earlier 
exploration.
3. The passage of the Mining (Gove Peninsula Nabalco Agreement) Ordinance 1968 resulted in the unsuccessful attempt 
by Yirrkala Aborigines to halt mining through the Northern Territory Supreme Court. This action is now generally viewed 
as the legal precursor to the High Court judgment in Mabo v Queensland (No. 2).
4. The distinction between uranium and other minerals and petroleum and gas is important. From the ABTA’s perspective, 
there is no difference between uranium and non-uranium royalty equivalents. But from the Commonwealth’s 
perspective there is one major difference: as uranium royalties are paid to the Commonwealth their transfer to the 
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Northern Territory merely represents income foregone. Non-uranium royalties, however, represent a greater net cost to 
consolidated revenue as the Commonwealth has to pay the equivalent of all royalties raised by the Northern Territory 
Government on Aboriginal land that Commonwealth consolidated revenue does not receive.
5. This is a simplifi cation because all mining agreements have additional negotiated fi nancial components, in the form of 
agreement or upfront payments, that will not be discussed here. It should be noted, though, that the major difference 
between the Hasluck fi nancial provisions and the ALRA is that the latter gave traditional owners a right to prevent 
exploration and mining on their land; this property right can be traded for private payments beyond statutory limits. 
6. This term is a misnomer because all royalty associations receive other agreement and rental payments.
7. This is a very overstated simplifying assumption because, increasingly, as the land claims process has slowed, especially 
in the last decade, land councils’ activities have focused on other functions like land management and development.
8. It is diffi cult to discern if such tension is between land councils and the ABTA Advisory Committee or bureaucracy 
(‘secretariat’): the former possibility makes little sense as the members of the Advisory Committee are nominees and 
generally members of land councils.
9 This is a complex issue. Following amendments to the ALRA in 1987, and since a Northern Territory Supreme Court 
ruling in 1992, it has transpired that disjunctive mining agreements are not permitted. This means that the right of 
consent can only be exercised in negotiations over exploration; if exploration is approved, the veto cannot be exercised 
at the production stage. The effi ciency impacts of this ruling are unclear.
10. The best comparative offi cial statistics on the relative economic status of Indigenous Australians in the Northern 
Territory come from the fi ve-yearly census. Comparing the proportion (Indigenous to other Australians in the Northern 
Territory) for three social indicators for the period 1976 to 1991 provides mixed results: median individual incomes 
increased from 32.2 per cent to 45.1 per cent; the employment population ratio declined from 57 per cent to 50 per 
cent and the unemployment rate remained almost identical with Indigenous Australians 2.3 times more likely to be 
unemployed if in the labour force.
11. Interestingly, the positive impacts of vehicle purchases funded by ABTA grants both for subsistence (hunting, fi shing and 
gathering) activity in particular and the outstations movement more generally have never been rigorously assessed.
12. In particular, one could contrast what the Commercial Development Corporation has achieved since its establishment 
in 1990 with a subvention of $40 million, with the commercial activities of the ABTA that had access to nearly $100 
million in grants and reserves (Tables 1 and 2).
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